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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of modern rules of evidence has been a process of
putting old wine into new bottles. That is, many of the old common
law rules and notions of evidence have been codified into modern day
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state and federal evidence codes. This Article examines one such re-
cent codification of a common law concept, forfeiture by wrongdoing,
into the Federal Rules of Evidence and seeks to determine whether
such codification was really necessary.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, used in federal courts and adopted
by many states, Puerto Rico, and the military are a codification of
many years of common-law evidence rules.1 The rules concerning
hearsay have been codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence at Article
VIII.2 The Rules recognize twenty-eight standard exceptions to the
hearsay rule.3 In addition, a number of "nonhearsay" exceptions 4 are
also recognized. Furthermore, Congress adopted Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5), as residual hearsay exceptions. These two rules allow intro-
duction of hearsay statements not specifically covered by any of the
named exceptions but having circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness if the court determines that certain stated conditions are met.5
In 1997, Congress amended the hearsay rules in two significant
ways. First, the residual hearsay rules of Rule 803(24) and Rule
804(b)(5), were combined into one new Rule 807.6 Then, in 1997 Con-
gress added a new provision, Rule 804(b)(6), which excluded forfeiture
by wrongdoing from hearsay.
The new Rule 804(b)(6) provides:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
1. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE,
tbl. T-1 (2d ed. 2000).
2. See FED. R. EVID. 801-807.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(6).
4. See FED. R. EID. 801(d).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), which reads as follows:
The following are not excluded from the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
the admission of statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
name and address of the declarant.
Federal Rule 804(b)(5) was identical in language except for its preamble which
states "the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is un-
available as a witness."
6. See FED. R. EVID. 807.
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(6) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that has
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure
the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.7
The promulgation of this new rule was another case of putting old
wine into a new bottle. In common terms, the rule established the
proposition that a defendant may not benefit from his or her wrongful
prevention of future testimony from a witness or potential witness.
According to its drafters Rule 804(b)(6) was intended as a prophylactic
rule to deal with abhorrent behavior which strikes at the heart of the
system of justice itself.8 That is, the killing of witnesses or other
wrongdoing that might prevent a witness from testifying at trial.
The concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing of hearsay statements has
existed as a policy argument in American law for over 100 years. The
questions are: 1) Was it really necessary to codify the concept of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing into the Federal Rules of Evidence; and 2) If it was
in fact necessary to do so, why did it take so long.9
The purpose of this Article is to answer these two questions, by
providing law students, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other le-
gal practitioners a contextual analysis of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
concept. To accomplish this, the Article will survey the historical
cases which first applied the forfeiture doctrine; examine the legisla-
tive history of the amendment; and then survey the reported cases
since the 1997 Rule 804(b)(6) amendment.
II. HEARSAY, THE FEDERAL RULES, AND CONFRONTATION
A. Hearsay
In order to facilitate an understanding of the forfeiture by wrong-
doing concept, a review of the definition of hearsay under the Federal
Rules is helpful. The rules define a statement as "an oral or written
assertion or nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by the per-
son as an assertion."' 0 Thus, hearsay under the rules is "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.""i This definition is an affirmative one which says that an out
of court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is
hearsay.12 Exceptions to the hearsay rule usually are justified on the
ground that evidence meeting the requirements of the exception pos-
7. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(6).
8. See FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(6) advisory committee notes.
9. Rule 804(b)(6) was adopted and became effective twenty-two years after the origi-
nal adoption of the Rules.
10. FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
11. FED. R. Evm. 801(c).
12. See KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., McComUcK ON EVIDENC E § 246 (John William
Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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sesses special reliability and often special need, such as the unavaila-
bility of the declarant.' 3 That is, there is an objective guaranty of
trustworthiness to such statements. 14
The factors upon which the value of testimony depends are the per-
ception, memory, narration and sincerity of the witness.' 5 In order to
encourage witnesses to put forth their best efforts and to expose inac-
curacies that might be present with respect to any of these factors, our
trial system has developed what is known as the testimonial ideal.
That is, witnesses are required to testify under oath, testify in person,
and be subject to cross examination. The rule against hearsay is de-
signed to insure compliance with these ideals. When one of them is
absent, a hearsay objection becomes pertinent.16 Hearsay evidence is
often characterized as unreliable and untrustworthy. Nevertheless
courts admit hearsay evidence under the numerous exceptions found
in the common law and in latter day statutes. Hearsay evidence ex-
hibits a wide range of reliability. The effort to adjust the rules of ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence to variations in reliability has been a
major motivating factor in the movement to liberalize evidence law.' 7
The exceptions that exhibit such guarantees of trustworthiness in
Rule 804(b) before the 1997 amendment included: former testimony
developed by direct, cross, or redirect examination;' 8 the dying decla-
ration;19 statements of personal family history;2o and, of course, state-
ments against interest.2 '
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to secure fairness
in administration of trials;22 eliminate unjustifiable expense and de-
lay;2 3 and promote the growth and development of the law of evidence
in order that truth may be ascertained and the proceedings justly de-
termined. 24 The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 197525 for use
in the federal courts and subsequently adopted by many states, have
13. See id. § 254.
14. See id. § 256.
15. Id. § 245.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
19. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
20. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
21. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See GLENN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY (1999).
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helped liberalize the introduction of trustworthy hearsay evidence at
trials.26
Forty-one states, Puerto Rico, and the military have adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence.27 The majority of these states adopted
rules of evidence based on the final Federal Rules of Evidence. 28 As
the Federal Rules of Evidence are amended some states amend their
corresponding rules to maintain similarity with the Federal Rules.29
The following states have not adopted rules of evidence based on the
Federal Rules: California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Virginia
and the Virgin Islands.30
The forty-one states, Puerto Rico, and the military that have
adopted the Federal Rules have all adopted rules similar to the hear-
say rule of 801.31 However, Pennsylvania is the only State that has
adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule.32
26. Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that "These rules shall be construed to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
27. See WE~sTriN & BERGER, supra note 1, at thl. T-1.
28. Id. at tbls. T2-T7: The Alabama Rules of Evidence became effective 111/96; Alaska
Rules effective 8/11/79; Arizona Rules effective 9/1/77; Arkansas Rules effective 7/
1/76; Colorado Rules effective 111/80; Delaware Rules effective 1/1/80; Florida
Rules effective 7/11/79; Hawaii Rules effective 1/81; Idaho Rules effective 111/85;
Indiana Rules effective 111/94; Iowa Rules effective 111/83; Kentucky Rules effec-
tive 1/1/92; Louisiana Rules effective 111189; Maine Rules effective 2/2/76; Mary-
land Rules effective 1/1/94; Michigan Rules effective 3/11/78; Minnesota Rules
effective 7/1177; Mississippi Rules effective 1/1/86; Montana Rules effective 7/1/
77; Nebraska Rules effective 8/24/75; Nevada Rules effective 1/1/71 (based on
Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules); New Hampshire Rules effective 1/1/85;
New Jersey Rules effective 111/93; New Mexico Rules effective 1/1173 (amended 7/
1/76 to conform to the changes made to the draft Federal Rules by Congress);
North Carolina Rules effective 7/11/84; North Dakota Rules effective 2/15/77; Ohio
rules effective 7/1/80; Oklahoma Rules effective 10/11/78; Oregon Rules effective 1/
1/82; Pennsylvania Rules effective 10/11/98; Puerto Rico Rules effective 10/1179;
Rhode Island Rules effective 10/1187; South Carolina Rules effective 9/3/95; South
Dakota Rules effective 7/11/78; Tennessee Rules effective 111/90; Texas Rules ef-
fective 3/1/98; Utah Rules effective 9/1183; Vermont Rules effective 411/83; Wash-
ington Rules effective 4/2/79; West Virginia Rules effective 2/11/85; Wisconsin
Rules effective 7/11/74 (based on Final Draft of the Federal Rules); Wyoming rules
effective 1/1/78. The Military Rules of Evidence are based on the Federal Rules
and were adopted 3/12/80.
29. Id. at tbl. T-1.
30. Id. at tbl. T-7.
31. Id. at tbl. T-106 to T-112.
32. Id. at tbl. T-155 to T-158.
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C. Hearsay and Confrontation
The introduction of any hearsay statement, at least in the criminal
law context, must be assessed in light of a defendant's right to con-
frontation under the Sixth Amendment.33 The Confrontation Clause
does not operate as an absolute ban on hearsay evidence.3 4 If the de-
clarant is unavailable and the statement bears adequate indicia of re-
liability, hearsay declarations may be received into evidence without
violating a defendant's right to confrontation. 3 5 These indicia of relia-
bility may be proven either of two ways: 1) where the hearsay state-
ment falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; or 2) where it is
supported by a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 36
Any defendant may voluntarily waive his right to confrontation.3 7
This is often done when a defendant enters a plea agreement. 3 8 By
entering this plea he relinquishes the right of confrontation. 39 In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court has long held that a defendant's intentional
misconduct can also constitute a waiver of rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause. 40 The doctrine that a defendant may waive or forfeit his
constitutional right to confront witnesses was codified in 1997, as Rule
804(b)(6). Statements that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay
may be introduced into evidence "if offered against a party that has
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness."4 ' This is
forfeiture by wrongdoing. The next section will analyze the cases
which utilized the doctrine of forfeiture before it was codified in the
Federal Rules and will show that it was old wine ready to be placed
into a new bottle.
III. THE HISTORIC FORFEITURE CASES
The historical examination of forfeiture by wrongdoing starts with
the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States.42 In Reynolds the U.S.
Supreme Court was asked to review the constitutionality of Reynolds'
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal cases, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . .
34. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
35. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
36. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.
37. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996).
38. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1966).
39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
40. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
41. See United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6)).
42. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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conviction for bigamy in the territory of Utah. Utah had not yet be-
come a state.43
Among Reynolds' claims of error was that testimony given by a wit-
ness named Schofield at an earlier trial for the same offence, but
under another indictment, was improperly admitted into evidence.44
Reynolds claimed he was not able to confront the witness at trial.4 5
The evidence revealed that the absent witness, Schofield, was actually
Reynolds' second wife who had testified at an earlier trial for the same
offense under a different indictment.46 The original subpoena for Ms.
Schofield had been issued to her under the wrong name.47 When a
court officer tried to serve the subpoena for Schofield, Reynolds told
the officer she was not home and indicated that the witness would not
appear at trial until served.48
Shortly thereafter it was discovered by the court officer that the
wrong name had been on the original subpoena and a new one was
issued. When the officer attempted to serve the second subpoena, he
was told by Reynolds' first wife that Schofield had not been home for
three weeks.49 The officer's inquiries around the neighborhood proved
fruitless. Upon hearing this information the territorial court allowed
Schofield's testimony from the earlier trial to be admitted in the
case.5 0 The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to show
that Reynolds had been instrumental in concealing or keeping the wit-
ness away from the trial.51
The Court found no error with the introduction of the earlier testi-
mony under the circumstances. The Court specifically held that "the
Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legiti-
mate consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privi-
lege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he
voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on the privi-
lege."52 The Court further held if the witness was absent by the pro-
curement of the accused, said witness' evidence supplied in some legal
way would not violate the right to confrontation. 53 This has come to
be known as forfeiture by wrongdoing.
The Court reviewed the history of forfeiture by wrongdoing and
found:
43. Id. at 146.
44. Id. at 153.
45. Id. at 158.
46. Id. at 159.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Id.
50. Id.





In Lord Morley's Case as long ago as the year 1666, it was resolved in the
house of Lords "that in case oath should be made that any witness, who had
been examined by the coroner and was then absent, was detained by the
means or procurement of the prisoner, and the opinion of the judges asked
whether such examination might be read, we should answer, that if their lord-
ships were satisfied by the evidence they had heard that the witness was de-
tained by means of procurement of the prisoner, then the examination might
be read; but whether he was detained by means or procurement of the pris-
oner was matter of fact, of which we were not the judges, but their lordships."
This resolution was followed in Harrison's Case and seems to have been recog-
nized as the law in England ever since. In Regina v. Scaife, all the judges
agreed that if the prisoner had resorted to contrivance to keep a witness out of
the way, the deposition of the witness, taken before a magistrate and in the
presence of the prisoner, might be read. Other cases to the same effect are to
be found, and in this country the ruling has been the same way .... So that
now, in the leading text-books, it is laid down that if a witness is kept away by
an adverse party, his testimony, taken on a former trial between the same
parties upon the same issues may be given in evidence.5 4
The Court explained that the foundation for the rule is the maxim
that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.
The Court believed the maxim grew out of the principles of common
honesty, and when properly administered would harm no one. 55 The
Court, therefore, affirmed Reynolds' conviction for bigamy.5 6
In 1912, the Supreme Court relied on its reasoning in Reynolds to
affirm the conviction of the defendant in Diaz v. United States.5 7 In
Diaz the Court reviewed the conviction on appeal from the Supreme
Court of the Philippines. Diaz was originally tried and convicted for
assault and battery upon Cornelio Alcanzaren.5 8 This was a misde-
meanor for which he was fined. Alcanzaren subsequently died as a
direct result of the injuries inflicted by Diaz.59 Diaz was then indicted
for the homicide of Alcanzaren. He was found guilty of the homicide, a
felony, and given a term of imprisonment.60
During the homicide trial Diaz was represented by counsel. How-
ever, on two occasions Diaz sent word to the trial court that he would
not attend the proceedings and that they should commence without
him, but in the presence of his lawyer.61 Testimony from Diaz's mis-
demeanor trial was admitted at the homicide trial.62 Upon his convic-
54. Id. at 158-59 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 159.
56. Id. at 168.
57. 233 U.S. 442 (1912).
58. Id. at 444.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 453.
62. Id. at 449.
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tion Diaz appealed on grounds of double jeopardy63 and a violation of
his rights to confront the witnesses against him.6 4
The Court found insufficient merit in Diaz's confrontation argu-
ment. The Court found that it was Diaz, and not the prosecution, who
had introduced testimony from the assault and battery trial.65 There
had been no objection to the introduction of the testimony by the gov-
ernment.66 In some respects the earlier testimony had been helpful to
Diaz, as well as to the prosecution.6 7 The Court, citing Reynolds,
stated:
The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate
consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntary keeps the wit-
nesses away, he cannot insist on the privilege. If, therefore, when absent by
his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no
condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.
6 8
Based upon the Reynolds rationale, the Court held that Diaz had
"by his voluntary act, placed in evidence the testimony disclosed by
the record in question, and thereby sought to obtain an advantage
from it, he waived his right of confrontation as to that testimony and
cannot now complain of its consideration."69 The conviction was
affirmed.70
In 1934, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the concept of for-
feiture by wrongdoing in Snyder v. Massachusetts,7 1 where Snyder
was convicted of a murder which grew out of an attempted armed rob-
bery of a filling station by him and two codefendants. 72 During trial
the government moved the court to have the jury view the scene of the
crime. Synder moved to be at the viewing with the jury. The court
denied his request.7 3 In dicta the Court, in a decision written by Jus-
tice Cardozo, alluded to Synder's rights to confront witnesses during
63. The Court found no merit to the double jeopardy claim. The Court held:
The homicide charged against the accused in the court of first instance
and the assault and battery for which he was tried before the justice of
the peace, although identical in some of their elements, were distinct
offenses both in law and in fact. The death of the injured person was the
principal element of the homicide, but was no part of the assault and
battery. At the time of trial for the latter the death had not ensued, and





66. Id. at 450.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 452 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158).
69. Id. at 452-53.
70. Id. at 459.
71. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
72. Id. at 102-03.
73. Id. at 103-04.
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every phase of the trial, including a viewing of the crime scene by the
jury, and stated "a prosecution in the federal courts in such circum-
stances also we make a like assumption as to the scope of the privilege
created by the Federal Constitution .... No doubt that the privilege
may be lost by consent or at times by misconduct." 74 Although
Synder's conviction was affirmed, the ruling was subsequently over-
ruled on other grounds. 75
In 1970, the Supreme Court expanded the concept of forfeiture of
confrontation rights by wrongdoing to defendants who engaged in dis-
ruptive and disrespectful conduct in the courtroom. In Illinois v. Al-
len,76 the defendant on trial for armed robbery repeatedly disrupted
the trial by abusive behavior and language toward the trial judge de-
spite warnings from the trial judge. The defendant Allen was subse-
quently removed from the courtroom during the State's case in chief.77
After a promise to discontinue his misconduct, Allen was allowed to
remain in the courtroom during presentation of his defense case by his
attorney. 78 After his conviction and subsequent state appeals, Allen
filed a writ of habeas corpus to the federal court alleging that he had
been denied his right to confrontation by being removed from the
courtroom. 79 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding
that Allen's Sixth Amendment right to be present at his trial was ab-
solute. It, therefore, reversed his conviction.8 0
The Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and instead accepted Justice Cardozo's state-
ment in Synder v. Massachusetts that the privilege of confronting the
witnesses may be lost by consent or misconduct.8 1 The Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit stating:
[w]e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be present at
trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he
continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting him-
self in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be pre-
sent can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct
himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of
courts and judicial proceedings .... 82
The concept of forfeiture of confrontation rights was also affirmed
in the 1982 case of United States v. Mastrangelo,8 3 in which the Sec-
74. Id. at 106.
75. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
76. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
77. Id. at 340.
78. Id. at 341.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 342.
81. Id. at 343.
82. Id.
83. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ond Circuit set out the burden of proof requirement that the govern-
ment must meet for the waiver by wrongdoing.
Mastrangelo had been convicted of conspiracy to possess with in-
tent to distribute marijuana and methaqualone tablets and importa-
tion of marijuana and methaqualone tablets.8 4 The court noted that
"[t]he sole link between Mastrangelo and the drug conspiracy was evi-
dence of his purchase of four trucks which were seized by narcotics
agents while loaded with the drugs."8 5 The only witness to the
purchase of the truck was James Bennet. Bennet testified in the
grand jury that he sold Mastrangelo the trucks under suspicious cir-
cumstances.8 6 Bennet further identified a tape recording wherein, a
few months before, Mastrangelo threatened him if he identified Mas-
trangelo to the grand jury as the purchaser of the trucks.87
On the third day of Mastrangelo's trial, Bennet was shot and killed
by two men as he left his home en route to the court house to testify.8 8
A mistrial was declared.8 9 At Mastrangelo's subsequent retrial on the
indictment, the government was allowed to introduce, pursuant to the
residual exception of the hearsay rule, Bennet's grand jury testimony
concerning Mastrangelo. 90 Mastrangelo objected on grounds that
such hearsay violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth
Amendment. The trial judge allowed the testimony on the ground
that the testimony "was surrounded with sufficient particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome [C]onfrontation [C]lause
objections . . 91
On appeal the Second Circuit acknowledged the concept of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing of one's Confrontation Clause rights as set out in
Supreme Court cases.9 2 The court took the position that if Mas-
trangelo had been involved in Bennet's death, his involvement would
work a waiver of his Confrontation Clause objections to the admission
of Bennet's testimony.9 3 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of Mas-
trangelo's involvement in the murder of Benet.94 The court believed
84. Id. at 270.




89. The trial judge declared a mistrial as to Mastrangelo and subsequently denied
his motion to bar re-prosecution on the basis of double jeopardy on grounds that
he believed that Mastrangelo, being the only person to benefit from Bennet's
death, had either ordered the murder or acquiesced in it. See id.







that an evidentiary hearing in the absence of the jury was necessary
before a finding of waiver could be made.95
The court further held that a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard of proof was the correct burden to apply to the government in a
claim of waiver by misconduct. 96 The court reasoned that such a
claim of waiver was not one which was "either unusually subject to
deception or disfavored by the law."9 7 The court found,
[t]o the contrary, such misconduct was invariably accompanied by tangible
evidence such as the disappearance of the defendant, disruption in the court-
room, or the murder of a key witness, and [that] there [was] hardly any reason
to apply a burden of proof which might encourage behavior which struck at
the heart of the system of justice itself.9 8
The cases of Reynolds and Diaz involved wrongdoing by defendants
but not a violent crime against the declarant. Synder, which was sub-
sequently overturned, considered the defendant's murder of the victim
sufficient for forfeiture. In Allen the forfeiture was brought about by
the deliberate conduct of the defendant in disturbing the process of
the trial. Mastrangelo, the first of the major forfeiture cases decided
after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, considered a cir-
cumstance where extreme violence was committed to prevent the de-
clarant from testifying. Perhaps this case was a prelude to the
modern era where criminal defendants are more prone to use violence
to prevent witness testimony.
The language and rationale of Mastrangelo seemed to have had a
profound impact on the drafters of the 1997 amendment which
brought us Rule 804(b)(6), the modern forfeiture of wrongdoing excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.99 This raises the question of "why" it took
such a long time to codify the rule. Mastrangelo was decided by the
Second Circuit in 1982. As we shall see from the legislative history in
the next section, it was not until 1992, ten years later, before the rule
was even proposed. Was it really necessary to recommend codification
at that time? Was it necessary to put this old wine in a new bottle?




99. See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1997 Amendment of Rule 804(b)(6), which
notes that Rule 804(b)(6) has been added to provide that a party forfeits the right
to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of a declarant's prior statement
when the party's deliberate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the un-
availability of the declarant of a witness. This recognizes the need for a prophy-
lactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior "which strikes at the heart of the




IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CODIFICATION OF
RULE 804(b)(6)
At first glance, the legislative history of the enactment of Rule
804(b)(6) appears slim and sketchy. A more detailed investigation
provides better answers as to "why" it may have been necessary to
codify the concept of forfeiture into the Rule and why it took so long.
The legislative history is, therefore, very valuable.
The legislative history of Rule 804(b)(6) reveals that in April of
1992, Professor Stephen Saltzburg, and Professor David Schlueter,
both members of the Criminal Rules Committee of the Advisory Com-
mittee in Rule of Evidence, considered and approved the rule for adop-
tion.OO The history further reveals that in July of 1995, the Rule was
approved for publication by the Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure.lOl
The Rule was then published for public comment in September,
1995.102 Later, in April of 1996, the Rule and comments received
thereon were considered and submitted to the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for transmittal to the
Judicial Conference.103 In June of 1996, the Rule was approved by the
Judicial Conference Committee.l0 4 Finally, the Rule was approved by
the full Judicial Conference in September, 1996105 and approved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in April of 1997.106 Rule 804(b)(6) then be-
came effective in December 1997.107
Although this presents an interesting chronology, it does little to
solve the mystery of why the codification and why then. Could the
answer have been that starting in 1992 when the Criminal Rules
Committee first proposed the rule that crime had become more violent
or that more witnesses in ongoing trials were being killed or prevented
from testifing by forms of intimidation? There is little statistical
data on this found in the legislative history.
Professor Stephen Saltzburg, one of the original committee mem-
bers who considered and proposed adoption of Rule 804(b)(6) in 1992,
is not surprised that there is little legislative history concerning the
100. See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Jan. 5,
2000, at www.uscourts.gov/rules/evdocket.pdf.
101. This Committee is also called the Standing Committee and is abbreviated in the









amendment.1 0 8 He states that there was little or no opposition to the
amendment by the committee.1 0 9 Although his memory of the history
of the amendment is now sketchy, it was his perception that at the
time of the proposal in 1992, there had been an increase in federal
trial witnesses being killed or intimidated into not testifying.liO He
also believes there may have been some pressure from Department of
Justice representatives on the committee for the new rule.1 1i As to
the mystery of why the amendment was proposed in 1992 and not
1982, shortly after the Mastrangelo case, Professor Saltzburg could
only opine that "it simply seemed like the right thing to do at the
time."11 2
Although Professor Saltzburg's memory concerning an increase in
witness intimidation in federal criminal trials may be accurate, it pro-
vides only anecdotal evidence. Actual crime statistics maintained by
the Department of Justice indicate that violent crime dropped
throughout most of the decade of the 1990s. 1 33 The actual statistics
reveal that violent crime in the U.S. decreased from "1.5 million vio-
lent crimes in 1998 to approximately 1.4 million in 1999, a drop of
nearly 7 percent."'1 4 Further, "[tlhe 1999 number represents the low-
est violent crime total recorded since 1985."115 Moreover, the total
shows "a decline of 20 percent from the 1995 level and a 21 percent
drop from the 1990 level."' 1 6
Yet another Department of Justice Studyii7 found evidence that
there had indeed been an increase in witness intimidation starting in
the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s.118 A number of prosecu-
108. Telephone Interview with Stephen Saltzburg, Howrey Professor of Trial Advo-
cacy and Director of the LL.M. Program in Litigation and Dispute Resolution,
George Washington School of Law, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 16, 2001).
109. Id.
110. Id. Professor Saltzburg, who lives in Washington, D.C. recalls that in the early to
mid 1990s federal prosecutors in Washington, D.C. were involved in a number of
high profile criminal prosecutions in which witnesses were allegedly killed or in-
timidated. These included the Rayful Edmund trial, the R Street Gang trial, and
the P Street Crew prosecution. Professor Saltzburg recalls that the author of this
Article had been appointed by the federal court to be lead defense counsel in the
1992 R Street Gang trial.
111. Id. Mary F. Harkenrider, Esq. and Roger Pauley, Esq., served as the U.S. De-
partment of Justice representatives to the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules.
112. Id.
113. See F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999 (2000), at
http//www.fbi.gov/ucr/99cius.htm.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Kerry Murphy Healey, Victim and Witness Intimidation: New Developments
and Emerging Responses, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN ACTION 2
(Justice Dep't Oct. 1995).
118. Id. at 2.
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tors linked this increase in violent victim and witness intimidation to
the advent of gang-controlled crack sales in the mid to late 1980s.11 9
Several prosecutors estimated that victim and witness intimidation is
suspected in up to 75-100 percent of the violent crimes committed in
some gang-dominated neighborhoods.120 A National Institute of Jus-
tice assessment found that "51 percent of prosecutors in large jurisdic-
tions and 43 percent in small jurisdictions said that intimidation of
victims and witnesses was a major problem... ."121 An additional 30
percent of prosecutors in large jurisdictions and "25 percent in small
jurisdictions labeled intimidation a moderate problem."1 22
There had been federal efforts to combat such witness intimidation
starting in the late 1960s and culminating in the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.123 "In 1982, the Victim and Witness Protection
Act expanded federal laws regarding witness security and victim ser-
vices by establishing significant penalties for witness tampering, in-
timidation and harassment."' 2 4 This included the new obstruction of
justice laws of 18 U.S.C. § 1512125 and 18 U.S.C. § 1513.126
So there is some statistical evidence from the Department of Jus-
tice that shows an increase in witness intimidation starting in the late
1980s. Such evidence still does not answer our questions concerning
codification of Rule 804(b)(6)-"why the codification" and "Why then"?
The best answers to these questions came in an interview with
John K. Rabiej,127 the long time Chief of the Rules Committee Sup-
port Office at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in Washing-
ton, D.C. Attorney Rabiej, when questioned on his opinion as to why
the codification of 804(b)(6) and why in the mid 1990s, indicated that
the answer was simple.128 It all had to do with Circuit Judge Ralph
K Winter, Jr.129 Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. became Chair-
man of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rule in late 1994.130
This was significant because Judge Winter of the Second Circuit is the





123. Id. at 6.
124. Id.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 applies to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant.
Penalties include the death penalty for the killing of a witness.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 applies to retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant.
Again penalties could include the death penalty if such witness, victim or inform-
ant was killed.
127. Telephone interview with John M. Rabiej, Chief of Rules Committee, Administra-






trangelo.'3 1 Attorney Rabiej, who attended all the Advisory Commit-
tee meetings, remembers Judge Winter telling members of the
Advisory Committee that the killing of the witness Bennet in the Mas-
trangelo case affected him deeply and led the judge to believe that the
long standing concept of forfeiture should be codified in the Federal
Rules.132
In substance, Attorney Rabiej provided notes from Judge Winter's
first Advisory Committee meeting as Chairman, held January 8 and
10, 1995.133 With respect to Rule 804, the notes provide:13 4
Itihe Committee also wished consideration of whether the present language in
the last sentence of subdivision (a) should be amended to cover issues raised
by opinions such as United States v. Mastrangelo when the defendant has pre-
vented the declarant from testifying. 1 3 5
Later in 1995, the Advisory Committee met again 36 and the min-
utes reflect Judge Winter's interest in seeing the concept of forfeiture
codified. The minutes of that meeting provide, in relevant part:
Waiver by misconduct. The Committee next considered whether it should cod-
ify the generally recognized principle that hearsay statements become admis-
sible on a waiver by misconduct notion when the defendant deliberately
causes the declarant's unavailability.
... The Committee agreed that codifying the waiver doctrine was desirable
as a matter of policy in light of the large number of witnesses who are intimi-
dated or incapacitated so that they do not testify. Consequently, the Commit-
tee chose a version of the rule that would not require having to show that the
defendant actively participated in procuring the declarant's unavailability.
... In addition, the Committee rejected imposing a "clear and convincing"
burden of proof on the prosecution, as is required in the Fifth Circuit, in favor
of the usual preponderance of the evidence standard used in connection with
preliminary questions under Rule 104(a), even when a constitutional rule is at
issue. 1 3 7
The minutes of the next meeting of the Advisory Committee 13 8 re-
lated that public comments that were received generally approved of
the proposed amendment.' 3 9 At the Committee On Rules of Practice
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Jan. 9-10,
1995, at www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutesl (on file with the author).
134. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at *6.
136. See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of May 4 and
5 1995, at http:j/www.uscourts.gov/rules/fMinutes/min-ev5.htm.
137. Id. at *4.
138. This meeting was held on April 22, 1996 in Washington, D.C.




and Procedure in 1996,140 Judge Winter pointed out to this full com-
mittee that the proposed new Rule 804(b)(6), labeled "forfeiture by
wrongdoing," would address the problem of witness tampering.141 Ac-
cording to Judge Winter, "[it would provide that a party who has en-
gaged in, or acquiesced in, wrongdoing intended to procure the
unavailability of a witness forfeits the rights to object on hearsay
grounds to admission of the prior statements of the witness."142
Judge Winter further explained to the Committee that his advisory
committee deliberately had chosen the broad terms "acquiesce" and
"wrongdoing" to avoid both over inclusion and under inclusion and to
leave room for common sense interpretation by the courts.143 The
Judge added that "Rule 403144 was applicable and allowed a judge to
exclude any evidence that was unreliable or prejudicial."'145
The Committee voted with one exception to approve the proposed
amendment and to send it on to the Judicial Conference.146 As dis-
cussed earlier in this Article,147 the Judicial Conference approved of
the Amendment in September of 1996. The Supreme Court approved
the Amendment in April 1997,148 and it became effective in December
of 1997.149
Thus, the mystery is resolved. Our questions as to the why and
when of the codification are answered. The answers may be summed
up by a confluence of timing and coincidence. The judge who wrote
the opinion in a case in which a witness was killed to silence him-
Judge Winter-several years later became the chairman of the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules. In a very real sense Rule
804(b)(6) can be viewed as a legacy to a Circuit court judge who be-
lieved as a matter of policy that our hearsay rules of evidence needed
"a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior which strikes at
the heart of justice itself."150 Thus, the answer to the "why" question
140. This committee met June 19-20, 1996 in Washington, D.C. See Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of the Meeting of June 19-20, 1996, at
http/www.uscourts.gov/ruleslMinutes/st6-96.htm.
141. Id. at *25.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *26.
144. Federal Rule 403 provides the following: "[alIthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. Evm. 403.
145. See Minutes of Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Minutes of the Meet-
ing of June 19-20, 1996, at http:J/www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/st6-96.htm at
*26.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying note 106.
149. See supra text accompanying note 107.
150. See Mastrangelo, 639 F.2d at 273.
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of codification of the forfeiture rule came about is because a jurist who
saw that in the modem era of codified evidence rules, such a prophy-
lactic rule was exigent and needed to be spelled out. The "why then"
question of the codification is answered by the fact that Judge Winter
became the Chairman of the Advisory Committee in the mid 1990s
when witness intimidation seemed to be on the rise. As Chair of the
Advisory Committee the minutes of his meetings reveal that he was a
strong advocate for the codification of the forfeiture by wrongdoing
rule.
By exploring and analyzing the legislative history of Rule
804(b)(6), one can better understand how the old wine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing came to be put in its new bottle of the Federal Rules. In
the next section this Article will analyze how the newly bottled old
wine of Rule 804(b)(6) has worked in the reported cases since the
amendment of 1997. This review evaluates whether it was truly nec-
essary to codify the rule.
V. FORFEITURE CASES SINCE THE 1997 AMENDMENT
The forfeiture by wrongdoing rule of 804(b)(6) has been cited in
federal cases from the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeal since the 1997 amendment. In United States
v. Dhinsa,15 the Second Circuit reviewed the racketeering, conspir-
acy, and murder convictions of Gurmeet Singh Dhinsa.15 2
Dhinsa was the leader of the Singh Enterprise, a racketeering or-
ganization centered around a chain of gasoline stations owned and op-
erated by Dhinsa throughout the New York City area.' 5 3 The
criminal enterprise was funded by a gasoline pump rigging scheme
that overcharged customers through the use of an elaborate electronic
device located beneath the gasoline pumps at the various stations
owned and operated by Dhinsa.154 Operated by remote control, the
rigging mechanism overcharged each customer six to seven percent on
each purchase. During the enterprise's ten year existence, the pump
rigging scheme generated tens of millions of dollars, which were used
to bribe public officials, purchase weapons, and carry out other crimes
of violence aimed at protecting the enterprise's operation and
profits.1 55
Among Dhinsa's claims on appeal were evidentiary issues involv-
ing Rule 804(b)(6).156 Dhinsa argued that admitting out of court
statements of Manmohan and Satinderjit, former employees who
151. 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 642.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 643.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 650.
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Dhinsa had order killed before they could cooperate with police, was
error.1 57 Specifically, Dhinsa objected to the hearsay statements in-
troduced as proof of the declarants' murders rather than as proof of
past events or offenses.' 5 8 Dhinsa alleged that introduction of such
evidence violated Federal Rule 403,159 Rule 802160 and his right to
confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment.1 6 i
The court dispatched each of Dhinsa's arguments and upheld his
convictions. The court, citing Mastrangelo16 2 and Diaz,163 held that
there was no violation of his right to confront the witness and reaf-
firmed the principle that a defendant who wrongfully procures the si-
lence of a witness will have waived his Sixth Amendment rights and
waived his hearsay objections.' 6 4 With respect to the subject matter
limitation of the Rule, the Second Circuit found the plain language of
the rule and the strong policy reasons favoring application of the
waiver by misconduct doctrine dispositive. The court concluded that
these factors placed no limitation on the subject matter of the declar-
ant's statement which could be offered against the defendant at
trial.165 The court did, however, suggest that the trial judge should
undertake a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect in
accordance with Rule 403, in order to avoid the admission of facially
unreliable hearsay. 66
The Second Circuit also held, consistent with their pre-Rule
804(b)(6) precedent, that prior to finding that a defendant waived his
confrontation rights with respect to an out of court statement by an
actual or potential witness, the trial court must hold an evidentiary
hearing outside of the presence of the jury.'6 7 Furthermore, at this
hearing the government has the burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant was involved in, or responsible for
procuring the unavailability of an actual or potential witness.16s
157. Id.
158. The court labels this subject matter limitation.
159. See supra note 145.
160. Federal Rule 802 provides the following: "[h]earsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. Evm. 802.
161. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 650.
162. United States v. Mastrangelo, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
163. Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442 (1912).
164. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 653.
166. Id. at 654 (citing United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997)).
167. In making this ruling the Second Circuit did note that the Eighth Circuit case of
United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999), held that 804(b)(6) did




A year earlier, the Fourth Circuit considered a Rule 804(b)(6) evi-
dentiary objection in United States v. Johnson.169 In Johnson,
Shaheem and Raheem Johnson, identical twin brothers, were con-
victed on nineteen counts related to their drug conspiracy, in further-
ance of which they murdered five people.170 The Johnsons argued
that the trial court erred by not excluding hearsay statements alleg-
edly made by Shawn Thomas regarding Raheem's involvement in the
murder of Antonio Stevens. Thomas was unavailable to testify at trial
because Raheem murdered him before the trial.171 Three witnesses
testified that Thomas told them that he was with Raheem when
Raheem murdered Stevens.172
Raheem Johnson argued that the trial court should have conducted
a hearing to confirm by clear and convincing evidence that Raheem
did cause Thomas' unavailability.' 73 The court found such standard
unnecessary under 804(b)(6), noting that it was not necessary to hold
such hearing and finding that the court could admit the evidence con-
tingent upon proof of the underlying murder by a preponderance of
the evidence.'74
Raheem also argued that even if Rule 804(b)(6) waived his right to
object to the fact that Thomas was not available for cross examination,
the hearsay testimony must be otherwise admissible as if Thomas was
available to testify.17 5 The court did not accept this argument and
found even if they were to conclude that in order to admit statements
under Rule 804(b)(6), the statements must be of such a nature that
they would be admissible if the unavailable witness were available to
testify, Raheem had not articulated how such a requirement would
have made Thomas's statements inadmissible.176 In short, the court
found that Thomas had first hand knowledge of Raheem's murder of
Stevens and could have testified to this had Raheem not murdered
Thomas.177 Such testimony would not have been inadmissible. The
court affirmed the convictions and found that with respect to Rule
804(b)(6), the trial court had not abused its discretion in holding that
169. 219 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at 352.
171. Id. at 355.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 356.
174. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court judge had held a
lengthy conference outside of the jury's presence to discuss the admission of
Thomas' hearsay. At the time Raheem's counsel did not request a separate evi-
dentiary hearing and did not contest that Raheem killed Thomas to prevent him






Raheem had forfeited his hearsay objections since he had caused the
unavailability of the witness.178
In the same year as Johnson, the Seventh Circuit, after reviewing
the facts in United States v. Ochoa,179 held that admission of certain
hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6) was improper. In
Ochoa, the defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to commit
mail fraud.180 The conspiracy stemmed from Ochoa's efforts to ease
pressing financial debt problems. He had reported his automobile sto-
len to avoid making the payments. Ochoa asked McLaughlin, a ten-
ant in his home, if he knew anyone who could help him make his car
disappear. McLaughlin suggested that Strange, his brother-in-law,
could dispose of the car.1 S1 Strange did set up a situation to dispose of
the car, but did not know that it was through an FBI undercover oper-
ation.' 8 2 Ochoa reported the car stolen and insurance proceeds were
fraudulently obtained, which allowed Ochoa's auto loan to be paid off
in full. Ochoa and Strange were indicted shortly thereafter.183 Subse-
quently, Strange entered into an agreement to plead guilty and testify
against Ochoa.184
McLaughlin, who by this time had moved out of Ochoa's house, was
asked to testify at trial in exchange for not being charged in the con-
spiracy.385 McLaughlin had told Agent May of the FBI about Ochoa's
plan to dispose of his automobile. Although McLaughlin agreed to tes-
tify, when the trial began McLaughlin could not be located.86 During
their search for McLaughlin, the FBI learned that McLaughlin had
made seven phone calls from Ochoa's residence to his former employer
during the two weeks before the trial began.' 8 7 At trial, the prosecu-
tion relied on Strange's testimony as well as an undercover FBI
agent's testimony. Over objection by Ochoa, the government also in-
troduced statements of McLaughlin through Agent May.' 88 The trial
court ruled that Ochoa had forfeited his objection to such hearsay by
his own wrongdoing in causing the unavailability of McLaughlin.'89
Ochoa testified in his own defense that, among other things, Mc-
Laughlin, (the former tenant) used his knowledge of the residence to
break in and make the telephone calls.' 90
178. Id. at 256-57.
179. 229 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2000).
180. Id. at 634.
181. Id.








190. Id. at 636.
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On appeal, Ochoa argued that the evidence was insufficient to
prove wrongdoing on his part.1 9 i The Seventh Circuit found that the
doctrine that a defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to
confront witnesses by misconduct had been codified in Rule 804(b)(6),
and that the showing of procured unavailability must be made by the
government by a preponderance of the evidence.1 9 2 The court held
that the evidence produced against Ochoa was insufficient to prove
wrongdoing. The only evidence that the government produced were
the seven telephone calls from Ochoa's residence allegedly made by
McLaughlin to his former employer.1 93 The court also found that Rule
804(b)(6) requires the conduct at issue to be wrongful, and that per-
mitting a witness at one's upcoming trial to use a phone, without
more, was not a culpable act.1 94 The government produced no evi-
dence that Ochoa knowingly aided McLaughlin in becoming unavaila-
ble. If the prosecution failed to proved that Ochoa knew that he was
helping McLaughlin to procure his unavailability, then Ochoa's con-
duct could not have been wrongful as required by the rule.19 5
The court, nevertheless, upheld Ochoa's conviction. Although the
court found that admission of McLaughlin's hearsay statements was
erroneous and violated Ochoa's rights under the Confrontation
Clause, it was held to be harmless error.i 9 6 The government had pro-
vided a substantial amount of evidence demonstrating Ochoa's guilt in
addition to the hearsay statements.1 97
In United States v. Peoples,198 the Eighth Circuit considered a case
in which Cornelius Peoples and his co-defendant Xavier Lightfoot
were convicted of aiding and abetting the murder of a federal govern-
ment witness.1 9 9 The government's theory at trial was that Peoples
and Lightfoot had entered into a contract to pay unknown persons to
kill Jovan Ross, because Ross was providing law enforcement parties
information about Lightfoot's criminal activity.20 0 The government
also argued that although Ross had no substantial information impli-
cating Peoples in criminal activity, Peoples believed his involvement
would soon be discovered, if Ross continued to cooperate with law
enforcement. 2o1





196. Id at 640.
197. Id. at 641.
198. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).





The defendants contended on appeal that the trial court erred by
denying their motion for a mistrial based on an improper statement
made by the prosecutor. 20 2 During the trial, a government witness
had testified about a statement that Ross had made to him. After de-
fense counsel made a hearsay objection, the prosecutor asserted that
the defendant had "murdered the witness" (referring to Ross). The
prosecutor argued that the statements were, therefore, admissible
under Rule 804(b)(6).203 The trial court judge overruled the hearsay
exception. The judge then "instructed the jury that the statement had
been admitted conditionally and that its ruling did not mean that the
court believed that the defendants had caused Ross to be
murdered."20 4
The Eighth Circuit held that "the prosecutor's remark was not im-
proper, because it merely reiterated the government's theory of the
case and provided for the admissibility of the proffered statement."20 5
The court concluded, further, that even if the remark was improper,
they were satisfied that the trial court's instruction was sufficient to
cure any potentially unfair prejudice.20 6
The Eighth Circuit had considered Rule 804(b)(6) earlier in United
States v. Emery.2 0 7 In Emery, a jury convicted the defendant of killing
a federal informant. The victim was Christine Elkins, who had been
cooperating with federal officials in an investigation of Emery's drug
trafficking activities. 20 8 Emery appealed his sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole. Among the errors he asserted was that the ad-
mission of several hearsay statements made by Ms. Elkins violated
Rules 403 and 802, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses testifying against him.209
The appeals court disagreed with his assertions by citing Illinois v.
Allen 210 as authority for the well-established principle that "a defen-
dant's misconduct may work a forfeiture of his or her constitutional
right of confrontation .... and that the right of confrontation is for-
feited with respect to any witness or potential witness whose absence
a decedent wrongfully procures."211 The court further held that such
"hearsay objections are similarly forfeited under Rule 804(b)(6), which
excludes from the prohibition on hearsay any 'statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that





207. 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999).
208. Id. at 924.
209. Id. at 926.
210. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
211. Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 (citation omitted).
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was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness.'" 2 12
The Emery court further noted that it was not necessary for the
trial court to have held a preliminary hearing outside of the jury's
presence, at which the prosecution would have had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Emery had procured Elkins' unavailabil-
ity, as Emery had argued.2 13 The appeals court noted that the trial
judge had "admitted the hearsay evidence at trial in the presence of
the jury, contingent upon proof of the underlying murder by a prepon-
derance of the evidence."2 14 In doing so, the trial court followed cases
dealing with the hearsay statements of co-conspirators. "In those
cases, evidence is admitted conditionally, subject to proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant and the declarant were co-
conspirators."2 15 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that this procedure
was appropriate.
With respect to Emery's Rule 403 argument, the court held that
the hearsay evidence from Elkins "possessed significant probative
value, particularly with respect to establishing Mr. Emery's mo-
tive."216 The court found that such "probative value was not substan-
tially outweighed by the threat of unfair prejudice or confusion."2 17
The appeals court, therefore, affirmed Emery's conviction. 218
Finally, in United States v. Cherry,219 the Tenth Circuit addressed
an interlocutory appeal on behalf of the government after the trial
court granted a motion to suppress out-of-court statements made by a
murdered witness. The appeals court was confronted with determin-
ing how the doctrine of waiver by misconduct and Rule 804(b)(6) ap-
plied to certain defendants. Such defendants were those "who did not
themselves directly procure the unavailability of a witness, but alleg-
edly participated in a conspiracy, where one of the members of the
conspiracy murdered the witness." 22 0
In Cherry the government had charged five defendants with in-
volvement in a drug conspiracy. They were Joshua Price, Michelle
Cherry, La Donna Gibbs, Teresa Price, and Sonya Parker.2 2 1 Much of
the evidence in their case came from a cooperating witness, Ebon





216. Id. at 927.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 928.
219. 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000).
220. Id. at 813.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 814.
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moved to admit out of court statements by Lurks, pursuant to Rule
804(b)(6), on the grounds that the defendants wrongfully procured
Lurk's unavailability. 22 3
The relevant facts of the case revealed that Joshua Price obtained
information that Lurks was cooperating with government officials in-
vestigating the drug ring. The facts further revealed that at about 11
p.m. on January 28, 1998, Joshua Price shot and killed Lurks.224 The
trial court held that Joshua Price had "procured the absence of Lurks
and hence Lurks' statements were admissible against him."2 2 5 The
trial court also held, "however, that there was insufficient evidence
that Teresa Price procured Lurks's absence and 'absolutely no evi-
dence that Cherry, Gibbs, and Parker had actual knowledge of, agreed
to or participated in the murder of... Lurks.'"226 The trial court re-
fused to find that the other four defendants had waived their Confron-
tation Clause and hearsay objections to Lurks's statement.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's
rulings. The Tenth Circuit concluded that in appropriate circum-
stances co-conspirators can be deemed to have waived confrontation
and hearsay objections. 22 7 In this instance the court remanded, hold-
ing that waiver may have been present as a result of the co-conspira-
tors' actions in furtherance of the conspiracy, within the scope of it,
and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of
the ongoing conspiracy. 2 28 The Court of Appeals found that the words
of Rule 804(b)(6), "engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing," supported
the notion that waiver of confrontation rights could be imputed "under
an agency theory of responsibility to a defendant who 'acquiesced' in
the wrongful procurement of a witness's unavailability," even if the
defendant "did not actually 'engage' in wrongdoing apart from the con-
spiracy itself."2 2 9 The court specifically held that "a co-conspirator
may be deemed to have 'acquiesced in' the wrongful procurement of a
witness's unavailability for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the waiver
by misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy the require-
223. Id.
224. Id. at 814.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 813.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 816.
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ments of Pinkerton."230 The Tenth Circuit then remanded the case to
the trial court for findings under this enunciated standard.2 31
VI. EVALUATION OF THE CASES SINCE THE
1997 AMENDMENT
The six court of appeals decisions cited in the foregoing section
should be evaluated in light of several factors. Those factors include:
1) did the opinion and analysis cite the underlying policy reason for
the forfeiture of wrongdoing rule; 2) were the historical forfeiture
cases used as additional authority for the admission of the statements;
3) did the court believe that it was necessary to hold an evidentiary
hearing in order to determine whether defendant procured the un-
availability of the witness; and 4) was there a need for a rule 403 bal-
ancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect. The Second,
Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals all appear to
have undertaken a thorough review of the facts in each of these cases
and applied all or some of these factors in reaching their well-reasoned
decisions.
The defendant in Dhinsa232 was certainly a violent criminal and
there was substantial evidence to support his conviction. Neverthe-
less, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did a thorough analysis of
the facts and the underlying policy reasons for finding that the hear-
say objections to the murdered witnesses' statements were forfeited
under Rule 804(b)(6) by the defendant. The court also cited the histor-
ical cases of Diaz2 33 and Mastrangelo2 34 as further support of the doc-
trine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.2 35 The Second Circuit also
suggested that a trial judge undertake for the record a Rule 403 analy-
sis to avoid admission of facially unreliable hearsay, even in light of
the defendant's wrongdoing. A concern that arises from the decision is
derived from the Second Circuit's pronouncement that the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing outside of the presence of the jury
230. Id. at 820. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). The
Pinkerton doctrine holds that evidence of direct participation in a substantive
offense is not necessary for criminal liability under the principles holding con-
spirators liable for the substantive crimes of a conspiracy. The Court specifically
held,
the overt act of one partner in crime is attributable to all .... If that can
be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the same or
other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not attributable
to the others for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substan-
tive offense.
Id.
231. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 813.
232. 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001).
233. 233 U.S. 442 (1912).
234. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
235. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652.
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prior to finding that the defendant was responsible for procuring the
unavailability of the witness. Rule 804(b)(6) does not require such a
hearing. Requiring a hearing in such cases may well cause a conflict
in the circuits.
The Fourth Circuit's ruling in Johnson236 was not as long or as
thorough as that of the Second Circuit in Dhinsa but it did cite the
policy reasons for the forfeiture rule in its decision. In Johnson, the
court found that there had been no abuse of the trial court's discretion
in admitting the statements of the murdered witness over Raheem's
hearsay objection.23 7 What is most noteworthy in Johnson is that the
Fourth Circuit specifically held that it was not necessary to hold an
evidentiary hearing outside of the jury's presence to determine
whether the defendant procured the unavailability of the witness. In-
stead, the appellate court held that the trial court could admit the
statements contingent upon proof of the underlying murder by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 23 8 This appears to be the correct way
Rule 804(b)(6) is to be interpreted.
Only in Ochoa23 9 did a court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
determine that admission of hearsay statements pursuant to 804(b)(6)
was improper. Admission of the hearsay statements-seven phone
calls made by the missing witness from the defendant's house within
two weeks before the trial-were not adequate evidence of conduct
demonstrating wrongdoing. 240 Although the court cited the policy
reason for the forfeiture rule, the court found that the government
produced no evidence of Ochoa's wrongdoing in keeping the witness
away. Ochoa presents a factual case where an evidentiary hearing on
procurement of the unavailability of the witness by the defendant
might be prudent to avoid facially unreliable hearsay, even though not
required by the Rule.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the waiver by forfei-
ture rule of 804(b)(6) in both Peoples24 1 and Emery242 and cited the
policy reasons for the Rule. In Emery, the court also relied upon the
historical case of Illinois v. Allen 243 for support of the well-established
principle that one's wrongdoing would work a forfeiture of confronta-
tion rights for hearsay purposes. It is also worthy to note that the
Emery court also ruled that it was not necessary to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing outside of the presence of the jury to determine the ad-
missibility of the statements.
236. 219 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2000).
237. Id. at 355.
238. Id. at 356.
239. 229 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2000).
240. Id. at 639.
241. 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001).
242. 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999).
243. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Cherry244 is note-
worthy as well. The court not only cited the policy reasons for the
forfeiture rule, but clarified how it might be used in co-conspirator
cases. The court concluded pursuant to the Pinkerton2 45 theory of lia-
bility that co-conspirators, who themselves may not have personally
procured the unavailability of the witness, could be deemed to have
waived their right to confrontation.
Rule 804(b)(6) may be used in both civil and criminal trials. The
rule may be utilized by any party who has evidence that a party oppo-
nent has procured the unavailability of a witness by wrongdoing. It
appears from this evaluation of the foregoing use of the rule in the
criminal cases that one seeking to invoke Rule 804(b)(6) against a
party opponent to permit the admission of hearsay procured by wrong-
doing should be prepared to address the evaluative factors set out
above. One should certainly 1) be able to articulate the policy reasons
underlying the rule; 2) be aware of the historical cases on forfeiture
which underpin the rule and be able to argue them; 3) be prepared to
argue against the need for an evidentiary hearing outside of the pres-
ence of the jury with respect to introduction of the statements, and 4)
be prepared to argue, pursuant to Rule 403, that the probative value
of the statements are not outweighed by their prejudicial nature given
the wrongdoing of the party opponent. A party should not profit from
his own wrongdoing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Analysis and evaluation of the forfeiture by wrongdoing cases de-
cided since the addition of its codification into Rule 804(b)(6) reveals
that these modern era cases document a shocking degree and level of
violence and intimidation against witnesses in federal trials. This Ar-
ticle demonstrates that federal prosecutors and judges are quite famil-
iar with the new rule on forfeiture and utilize it unsparingly in an
effort to insure that relevant testimony is admitted despite the fact
that the declarants have been intentionally silenced.
Having reviewed the history of the concept of forfeiture by wrong-
doing, explored the legislative history of the new Rule, and assessed
the cases utilizing the new rule, one question still exists: was the codi-
fication of forfeiture by wrongdoing into Rule 804(b)(6) necessary?
Stated another way, would there have been any difference in the out-
come of the post 1997 cases using the case law of Reynolds, Diaz and
Mastrangelo rather than the new rule? The answer is, of course not.
So, why the codification?
244. 217 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2000).
245. See supra text accompanying note 228.
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The answer is that in this modem era, codification of such a hear-
say rule is a reliable and effective means of insuring that there will be
a prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent "behavior which strikes at
the heart of the system of justice itself."246 In essence, with respect to
our modern day evidence code, it is probably best to put old wine into
new bottles.
246. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).
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